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Chapter 10
Dimensions of 401(k) Plan Design
Olivia S. Mitchell, Stephen P. Utkus, and Tongxuan (Stella) Yang
Defined contribution (DC) plans today are at the core of the US retirement
system, with over 60 million employees holding $2.4 trillion in DC plan
assets.1 The number of DC plan participants has also grown rapidly in the
past two decades, at almost double the rate of labor force increase. Today it
is estimated that employer-sponsored DC plans will provide larger retire-
ment benefits than social security for the Baby Boom generation (Poterba
et al. 2004). Prior research has explored how DC plan features shape
employee saving behavior, particularly in the case of the popular 401(k)
plan.2 By contrast, in the present chapter, we focus on the question of how
and why employers select their plan design features.
Our analysis seeks to evaluate various rationales provided to explain
401(k) plan design features. Some contend that employers utilize such
plans to shape workforce characteristics—such as age, tenure, or even the
male–female mix. Others argue that 401(k) plans are mainly a way to tax-
defer compensation, albeit under complex rules. To highlight the relevant
issues, we examine a rich new data-set of several hundred 401(k) plans
covering more than 740,000 employees, containing unique detail on plan
design features, workforce characteristics, and industry sectors. We are able
to model employer matching contributions with exceptional precision, and
we also incorporate important nonmonetary design features including the
plan investment menu and the presence of loans which we argue reflect
liquidity and investment constraints inherent in 401(k) plans.
We show that promised 401(k) matches vary from 0 to more than 6
percent of pay, and that the median employer promises a match equivalent
to 3 percent of pay. We evaluate the factors which explain the wide vari-
ation in promised matches, acknowledging that this variation may be
driven in part by the value assigned to compensation paid in the form of
matching contributions, presumably influenced by workers’ marginal pro-
pensity to save and marginal tax rates. As well, employers may intentionally
direct a portion of their compensation budgets toward (or away from)
workers with particular age, tenure, or other characteristics. The latter
view has found support in prior research which shows that employee
utilization of 401(k) plans is linked to workers’ age, tenure, sex, and
income levels. Our evidence shows that these plans appear to mainly be
tax motivated, constrained by federal nondiscrimination rules. In other
words, to appeal to better-paid workers, employers offer more generous
monetary and nonmonetary plan design features. At the same time, com-
plex federal tax rules restrict pay discrimination in favor of the highly paid
employees.
In what follows, we first briefly describe our methodology and data.
Next we report our analysis of the determinants of employer plan design
decisions. A final section offers conclusions and implications.
Hypothesis and Method
Prior studies have mainly focused on how the employees respond to 401(k)
plan designs. Typically these analyses relate worker participation and contri-
bution levels in 401(k) plans to employees’ age, income, tenure, and other
characteristics. A serious drawback of these studies is that they all treat
employer matching contributions as exogenous, without asking why firms
might offer matching contributions—and indeed, other plan features—in
the first place. One explanation for the observed heterogeneity in 401(k)
design could be that plan design represents a form of compensation motiv-
atedpredominantly or exclusively by the tax deferral incentives offeredunder
the federal tax code, about which we say more in the next section. Another
possibility is that 401(k) plans, like other benefit programs, are used by
employers to attract a workforce with specific characteristics.
US employers have substantial flexibility regarding the design of their
retirement plans. Offering a retirement plan is voluntary, and most private-
sector firms that offer an employer-sponsored retirement program today
include a 401(k) plan. A key element in such a plan is that the employeemust
first contribute some portion of his salary to the plan—known as the
employee’s ‘elective deferral’ or ‘salary deferral amount’—before he is
entitled to any matching contribution. Employees are afforded substantial
tax incentives under the law for saving within 401(k) plans. Thus employee
contributions from current wages are tax-deductible (up to $10,500 in
2001, the year of our data set); employer matching contributions are
exempt from current taxation; and all investment earnings on the pension
account are compound tax-free until withdrawal (which is typically later in
life, when tax rates may be lower). By contrast, employers realize no
particular tax advantage from offering a 401(k) plan: a firm can generally
deduct compensation paid in the form of taxable wages or contributions to
a tax-qualified retirement plan.3
Under the hypothesis that a 401(k) plan is used mainly as a device for
obtaining tax-advantaged compensation, several factors would be antici-
pated to play an important role in plan design. For example, a company
paying higher average compensation would be expected to have a more
generous match, because salary levels will lead workers to prefer
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tax-deferred saving. The 401(k) plan will also be influenced by the avail-
ability of other forms of tax-advantaged compensation, such as some other
defined benefit (DB) or DC retirement plan, in addition to the 401(k)
plan. Larger plans are likely to be less expensive to operate, and thus
benefit from economies of scale in plan administration. All of these con-
siderations would also be shaped by the complex series of federal tax rules
that govern such plans, including the rules of nondiscrimination testing
about which we say more below.
An alternative view, widespread in the benefits-consulting community, is
that 401(k) plans are designed to attract and retain workers according to
desirable workforce traits such as age or tenure.4 An elaboration on this
view is offered by Ippolito (1997) who suggests that employers with DC
plans use match rates along with deferred vesting to direct some portion of
compensation to ‘savers’ who he concludes have lower quit rates and
higher jobperformance ratings.5 In such a situation, factors such asworkers’
compensation levels, age, tenure, and sex, as well as saving behavior within
the 401(k) plan, might be important determinants of plan design and
employee behaviors.
To assess these determinants of 401(k) plan design, we develop an
empirical model of the employer’s plan decision-making. Here employers
are presumed to structure the monetary and nonmonetary features of their
401(k) plans so as to realize their plan design goals. For instance, if 401(k)
plan design features were mainly driven by preferences for tax-motivated
compensation among better-paid employees subject to applicable tax law
constraints, we might anticipate a positive link between average compen-
sation level and the generosity of the plan match rate. By contrast, if a firm
wished to attract and retain a particularly stable workforce, plan features
would be geared toward older, better-paid, and longer-tenured workers.
This formulation, shown in Equation (1), thus proposes that key plan
design features (PDj,) are shaped by both labor and product market fac-
tors. These include workforce characteristics (EEj), employer-level controls
(ER j), and indicators of how constraining tax rules might be (TAXj):
PDj ¼ b0 þ b1  ER j þ b2  EEj þ b3  TAXj þ «I: (1)
The PDj vector measures the presence and value of employer contribution
matches as well as nonmonetary features that relate to the investment and
liquidity constraints within 401(k) plans. Investment variables include how
many investment funds are offered to participants; how concentrated fund
investment menus are in equity funds; and whether the employer offers
company stock in the plan as an investment choice. Features that reduce
liquidity costs of 401(k) saving include the presence of after-tax contribu-
tions or loans. Employer-side controls include firm size, as a proxy for
economies of scale, and industrial sector.
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To the extent that firm-side factors drive design decisions, we would
anticipate that the b1 term would be nonzero. In addition, if design
features are driven by the need to attract and retain a suitable workforce,
we would expect b2 to be nonzero. And finally, if a 401(k) plan’s features
are constrained by nondiscrimination or other limits, we would anticipate
that the b3 term would be nonzero.
Empirical Considerations in Nondiscrimination Testing
Analysis of 401(k) plan design is complex due to three issues: the unit of
analysis, the complexity of plan design, and US tax rules governing retire-
ment plans. Prior research has not always taken these important issues into
account, yet they are of vital importance to understand plan design in the
US context. To each we turn briefly.
Unit of Analysis. The 401(k) universe is highly skewed, meaning that
statistical analysis will be quite sensitive to the level of aggregation used
for analysis. For instance, in our sample (to be described in more detail
later), the largest 3 percent of the plans account for half of all covered
employees, and the largest 50 percent of plans account for 96 percent of
covered employees.6 Since we seek to explore plan design decisions at the
firm level, the firm is the appropriate level of analysis. Of course, this means
that this firm-level analysis will include many smaller and medium-sized
firms. By contrast, employee-level analyses will be weighted toward plan
features and behavior of larger firms, a point often overlooked when
interpreting evidence on 401(k) plans.
Complexity of Plan Design. Few prior studies have dissected the
interesting nonlinear and complex saving incentives inherent in 401(k)
plan matching structures.7 For instance, employer matches tend to be
noncontinuous, bunching at particular values. Additionally, 401(k) plans
contain many features that affect liquidity and investment constraints,
including different investment menus and differential plan access to
loans and after-tax contributions. The presence of other retirement plans
will also likely to influence both saving and investment behavior within
401(k) plans, competing with 401(k) plans as a source of tax-deferred
compensation, and in the case of employer- and government-guaranteed
DB benefits, influencing risk-taking within the 401(k) plan. Studies which
do not control on such factors will naturally find results which differ from
the analysis to follow.
Tax Rules and Testing. Tax considerations play an essential role in
determining 401(k) plan design and employee behavioral responses.
Specifically, most forms of compensation in the USA are subject to
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progressive income taxes; as noted, above, pension contributions are
generally tax-deferred, but only as long as they satisfy a series of tax rules,
most of which restrict allowable contributions. In particular, under Section
402(g) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), employees are limited as to the
amount of current wages they can contribute to a 401(k) plan—in the year
of our plan data, 2001, the limit was $10,500 per year. This rule effectively
censors plan saving rates; for example, someone earning $150,000 in 2001
had a maximum possible plan saving rate of 7 percent ($10,500 divided by
$150,000). Meanwhile, a person earning $1 million had a maximum
possible plan saving rate of about 1 percent of pay.
US retirement plans are also subject to two types of nondiscrimination
rules. One set is called the general nondiscrimination rules, requiring, among
other details, that the ‘rights, features and benefits’ of a plan be allocated
equitably across eligible participants. Under this rule, no plan may offer,
for example a higher match to higher-paid employees or to employees
based on managerial rank. A second set of rules, particularly important for
401(k) plans, is the so-called nondiscrimination testing (NDT ) rules, for
pretax 401(k) elective deferrals. Under these rules, an employer must
divide its eligible plan participants into two groups: the highly compen-
sated employees (HCEs, earning $85,000 or more in 2001) and the non-
highly compensated employees (NHCEs, or those earning below $85,000
in 2001). In the most common situation, the plan contribution rate of the
HCEs may not exceed that of the NHCEs by more than 2 percent.8
When calculating plan saving rates under NDT rules, however, an
employer may only count income subject to the Section 401(a) definition
of compensation, which is the maximum level of pay that can be consid-
ered for retirement plan purposes; it was $170,000 per year in 2001. Thus,
an employee earning $1 million and contributing $10,500 may have an
actual plan contribution rate of just over 1 percent ($10,500 divided by $1
million). However, his plan saving rate for federal tax purposes is defined as
6.18 percent ($10,500 divided by $170,000). In other words, in any given
401(k) plan, as the number of highly compensated employees earning
more than $170,000 and contributing $10,500 increases, saving rates for
the HCE group will converge toward 6.18 percent for federal tax purposes.
As a result, to comply with nondiscrimination testing rests, the employer
must encourage the NHCEs to save at least 4.18 percent of earnings (2
percent less than the HCE threshold of 6.18 percent). In addition, many
plans will seek to boost NHCE saving rates above this level, because not all
HCEs in the plan earn more than $170,000 annually, and not all HCEs will
contribute the maximum $10,500 per year.9
Finally, two other rules constrain highly paid employee contributions
and employer matches in 401(k) plans. Under IRS Section 415, total
employee and employer contributions to any tax-deferred retirement plan
cannot exceed 25 percent of pay or $35,000. For example, a worker earning
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$40,000 in 2001 could only receive total employer and employee contribu-
tions of $10,000. In addition, a 15 percent limit for profit-sharing plans also
applies, since 401(k) plans are technically organized as profit-sharing plans
under US law; as a result, they must generally limit employee and employer
contributions to 15 percent of the firm’s total wage bill. Consequently,
depending on how many eligible participants actually join the plan and the
amounts contributed, plan participants could be subject to a 15 percent
(or occasionally higher) limit on the sum of employer and employee
contributions.
Next, we turn to an examination of data-set used in the analysis and we
quantify how many employees are subject to these different tax law
constraints.
Description of 401(k) Plan Features
Our analysis of the determinants of plan design draws on a unique and rich
set of administrative records for 507 401(k) plans, obtained from Vanguard
for the 2001 plan year.10 Each plan record includes information on im-
portant design features including the employer’s match formula, features
of the plan’s investment menu, the presence of other retirement plans
(such as a DB or other DC plan), and indicators of participant access to
plan accumulations prior to retirement. We also gained access to records
for the 740,000 employees in the firms offering these plans; these data
included age, sex, job tenure, earnings, plan participation, plan contribu-
tion, and asset and contribution allocation information.11
401(k) Plan Design Features. Key attributes of the 401(k) plans in our
sample appear in Table 10-1. The mean employer is a mid-sized firm with
about 1,500 employees; some 82 percent offered a match for employee
401(k) plan contributions.12 Matching formulas range from zero (18
percent of plans) to very generous matches of more than dollar-for-dollar
on at least 6 percent of pay (2 percent of plans).
Our empirical tactic divides the nonlinear 401(k) match formula into an
incentive element, reflecting how much the employee is rewarded per dollar
contributed; and a liquidity element, indicating how much compensation the
employee must ‘tie up’ in the 401(k) plan in order to receive the entire
employer incentive payment. Accordingly Match_f3 indicates the value
of the employer’s matching contribution on the first 3 percent of
pay contributed by the employee (i.e. from 0 to 3 percent); Match_n3
captures the rate on the next 3 percent of pay (i.e. from 4 to 6
percent of pay); and Match_n2 reflects the value of the match on an
additional 2 percent of pay (i.e. over 6 percent and up to 8 percent of
pay). Another variable, Contr4 MaxMatch, captures howmuch the employee
must contribute to receive the maximum subsidy from the employer. For
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example, in a tiered formula that paid dollar-for-dollar up to 2 percent and
50 cents per dollar from 2 to 4 percent, the maximum required employee
contribution is 4 percent. When calculating the maximum amount the
employer promises in the form of matching contribution, we find that
Table 10-1 Employer 401(k) Plan Design: Descriptive> Statistics (Plan Level)
Panel A. Employer match rates and other plan design features‘
Variable name Mean
Number of employees covered Plan_size 1,460
Employer plan provides match for
employee contributions
Positive_match 82%
Match rate on first 3% of compensation (0–3%) Match_f3 $0.55 on $1
Match rate on next 3% of compensation (3–6%) Match_n3 $0.37 on $1
Match rate on next 2% of compensation (6–8%) Match_n2 $0.05 on $1
Match rates conditional on a match being offered:
Match rate on first 3% of compensation (0–3%) $0.67 on $1
Match rate on next 3% of compensation (3–6%) $0.49 on $1
Match rate on next 2% of compensation (6–8%) $0.44 on $1
Promised employer match as % of pay MaxCostErMatch 3.00%
Employee contribution required for maximum
employer plan match (the ‘match cap’)
Contr4MaxMatch 4.90%
Number of funds offered in plan NFundsOffered 12.6
Fraction of funds offered that are equity funds Fund_stock 65%
Employer stock offered in plan ER_stock 19%
Employer plan permits after-tax contributions After_tax 24%
Employer plan offers loan loan 85%
Match_f3 Match_n3 Match_nn2
MaxCostE
RMatch After_tax Nfunds Fund_stock ER_Stock Loan
Match_f3 1
Match_n3 0.63 1
Match_n2 0.10 0.27 1
MaxCostE RMatch 0.34 0.56 0.56 1
After_tax 0.19 0.18 0.05 0.08 1
Nfunds 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.09 1
Fund_stock 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.32 1
ER_Stock 0.20 0.16 0.01 0.09 0.32 0.12 0.06 1
Loan 0.08 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.18 0.09 1
Panel B. Correlations among plan design features
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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about one-third of plans promise to provide below 3 percent of pay; about
one-third, exactly 3 percent; and about one-third, more than 3 percent.13
Panel A of Table 10-1 shows that the mean match by firms offering a match
is 50 cents per dollar on the first 6 percent of employee contributions, as
reported in prior studies (cf. Papke 1995). But we also find that employer
match patterns are extremely nonlinear: the average firm matches an aver-
age of 55 cents per dollar the employee contributes on his first 3 percent of
salary; 37 cents per dollar on his next 3 percent of pay; and only 5 cents per
dollar for his next 2 percent of pay. There is also substantial variation in the
so-called ‘match cap’ which is the amount the employee must deposit to
obtain the largest possible employer subsidy: the mean is around 5 percent
of pay, while the median is 6 percent. The nonlinearity of 401(k) matching
contributions is captured in Figure 10-1, which summarizes the match rate
and tier for 360 single-tier formulas in our sample.
These 507 plans also offer an average of 12.6 investment choices in their
plan menus; 19 percent offer employer stock as an investment choice; and
two-thirds of the investment options are equity funds. It is interesting to
note that the majority, but not all, of the plans (85 percent) give employees
access to their retirement accounts via a loan feature, which affords liquidity
30%
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Figure 10-1. Distribution of employer match patterns in single-formula plans
(360 plans).
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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often perceived to be particularly attractive to low-wage savers. A quarter of
the plans permit after-tax contributions, which allow employees a way to gain
preretirement access to a portion of their saving; they also offer a tax
benefit, tax-deferred earnings, to those who reach pretax savings limits.14
Panel B of Table 10-1 shows the correlations among key plan design
variables. We find that, in general, 401(k) plans are consistently generous
in different design features. Match_f3 is highly correlated match_n3, with
the correlation coefficients at 0.63; the match cap, Contr4MaxMatch, is
highly correlated at all levels of match (Match_f3, match_n3, and match_n2),
with correlations at 0.34, 0.56, and 0.56 respectively. The high-correlation
coefficients above indicate that generous employers not only provide
higher match to every dollar that employees contribute to their 401(k)
account, but also match up to a higher percentage of employees’ own
contribution. Panel B also tells us that the offering of employer stock is
positively correlated with the first and next 3 percent of employer match. In
addition, the more funds offered in a 401(k) plan, the higher the propor-
tion of stock funds.
It is worth noting that retirement plan designs are complicated along
other dimensions. Figure 10-2 indicates that the 401(k) plan designs fall
into four broad categories: firms offering 401(k) plans alone (some 39
percent of plans); firms offering 401(k) plans accompanied by another DC
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1,000
2,000
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Figure 10-2. The coexistence of DC and DB plans (507 plans).
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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plan such as a money purchase, profit-sharing, or ESOP plan (28 percent);
firms providing 401(k) plans paired with a DB plan (20 percent of plans),
and firms offering 401(k) accompanied by both a DB plan and other DC
plans (14 percent).15 Clearly, those who see US private pensions as being
either of the DB or DC variety have far too simplistic a view. Accordingly,
the analysis is to follow controls on the existence of other DB or DC plans as
factors influencing 401(k) plan generosity.
A summary of plan-level employee characteristics for the more than
740,000 workers in the full sample appears in Table 10-2. The average
participant in the average plan is nearly forty-three years old, earns
$63,900 a year, has spent almost nine years on the job, and possesses a
401(k) account with the balance of $54,400. Comparing our data with
those of the EBRI/ICI 2001 (Holden and VanDerhei 2003), these two
data-sets are identical in median age and tenure. However, the median
compensation and average account balance of our data-set are higher than
those of EBRI/ICI at $30,130 and $43,215 respectively.
Multivariate Analysis
To evaluate how employers design 401(k) matching contributions, we turn
to Table 10-3. For the set of 507 plans, we see that match generosity is
clearly a function of firm size (columns 1, 2, and 6). Larger firms are more
likely to provide a match in the first place and a more generous match on
the first 3 percent of pay, as well as a larger overall economic value to the
match (MaxCostERMatch). For example, a 10 percent increase in firm size
evaluated at the mean will raise the value of the promised match by 9
percent. This firm size effect disappears on higher levels of pay, presumably
because larger firms are more likely to offer another DB or DC plan besides
the 401(k) plan. In effect, as firm size increases, employers appear to offer
other retirement plans, and so they are marginally less generous with the
401(k) matching contribution.16
Table 10-2 Employee Characteristics for the Analysis
Sample
Variable name Plan mean
Age Mean_age 42.7 years
Income ($000) Mean_comp $63.9
Job tenure Mean_tenure 8.7 years
Sex (% female) Female_pct 36%
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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In terms of workforce characteristics, the sponsor’s 401(k) match for-
mula proves to be positively associated with NHCE pay levels: that is, the
probability of offering any match, as well as larger match rates on the first 6
percent of pay, rise with pay (columns 1–3), as does the overall economic
generosity of the match (column 6). In other words, the design of the
employer match pattern is clearly motivated by workforce pay levels. The
effects are modest in size but statistically significant. For example, if the
mean NHCE income of $42,000 increases by 10 percent, the match rate on
Table 10-3 Determinants of Employer 401(k) Plan Design: Match Features (All
Employees)
Components of employer 401(k) match
Positive_
Match Match_f3 Match_n3 Match_n2
Contr4Max
Match
MaxCost
ERMatch
Employer characteristics
Plan_size 0.044 4.474 0.443 0.027 0.104 0.187
[0.013]** [1.468]** [0.919] [0.461] [0.069] [0.071]**
DB 0.026 7.308 3.697 3.933 0.016 0.32
[0.043] [4.100] [2.909] [1.714]* [0.252] [0.238]
DC 0.024 1.464 7.288 0.168 0.26 0.277
[0.036] [3.670] [2.299]** [1.378] [0.226] [0.205]
Employee characteristics
HCE_pct 0.003 0.041 0.022 0.075 0.023 0.007
[0.002] [0.149] [0.090] [0.061] [0.008]** [0.009]
Mean_comp_ 0.007 0.729 0.315 0.075 0.022 0.05
NHCE [0.003]** [0.245]** [0.124]* [0.088] [0.015] [0.013]**
Mean_age 0.01 1.299 0.496 0.524 0.044 0.083
[0.008] [0.694] [0.433] [0.313] [0.049] [0.046]
Mean_tenure 0.013 1.296 0.167 0.171 0.08 0.083
[0.007] [0.666] [0.434] [0.295] [0.040]* [0.042]*
Female_pct 0.0004 0.126 0.065 0.051 0.012 0.003
[0.001] [0.110] [0.070] [0.049] [0.006] [0.007]
Observations 507 507 507 507 507 507
R2 0.07 0.11 0.43 0.11 0.52 0.1
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in brackets.
Industry controls included. NDT_cap is controlled in all models. In the regression of
higher level of match, i.e. Match_n3 andMatch_n2, the lower level match rates, Match_f3
and Match_n3, are controlled.
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the first 3 percent of pay rises by 6 percent (from $0.55 to $0.58), and the
match rate on the next 3 percent rises by 4 percent (from $0.37 to $0.39).
The variation in the match design according to different levels of NHCE
income is also estimated, holding all other independent variables at
their means. For example, for a workforce with a mean NHCE income of
$25,000 (approximately the bottom 5 percent of firms), 80 percent of
firms offer a match, and the maximum promisedmatch amount on average
to 2.3 percent of pay. For a workforce with a mean NHCE income of
$55,000 (the top 5 percent of firms), all firms offer a match, and the
promised match is more than one and a half times higher, at almost 4
percent of pay.
Because the general nondiscrimination rules restrict employers from
favoring HCEs over NHCEs, and since the dollar contribution caps more
effectively bind HCEs rather than NHCEs, we find that only NHCE income
is a statistically significant factor in our regression analysis. The percentage
of HCEs in a plan has no influence on plan generosity, suggesting that
federal limits are binding. Equally important is what the data do not show.
Plan design bears no apparent relationship to workforce characteristics
other than pay. This finding is of interest since, if employers fashioned
their match formulas to attract and retain workers with specific demo-
graphic characteristics, we might anticipate significant coefficients on
such factors as employee age and tenure. However, no such relationships
are evident. There is one exception: employers appear to reward shorter-
tenure workforces with a higher match, but only as long as they contribute
more of their own income. As we argue below, this effect is readily
explained by efforts to satisfy federal nondiscrimination testing rules
among short-tenured workforces. Overall, the employer match appears to
be mainly motivated by the need to offer better-paid employees higher
compensation in the form of 401(k) matching contributions. Yet due to the
tax rules constraining contributions by the highly paid, these incentives
prove to be a linear function of NCHE income only.
Next we consider the factors shaping 401(k) plan nonmonetary features,
reported in Table 10-4. Here we examine three attributes of the investment
menu: the number of funds (NFundsOffered ), the percentage of the menu
that represents stock funds (Fund_Stock), and the presence of company
stock (ER_Stock); and also preretirement access, namely the availability of
after-tax contributions and loans (After_Tax and Loan, respectively). Not
surprisingly, an important determinant of the plan menu features is again
plan size. Probably due to scale economies, larger employers are more
likely to offer more funds in the investment menu, a larger percentage of
equity funds, and company stock, and they are also more likely to permit
after-tax contributions and participant loans. Firms which offer DB plans
are more likely to offer employer stock in their DC plans (consistent with
recent findings by Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner 2004).
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Turning to workforce variables, once again relatively few employee attri-
butes appear to be associated with plan design features. All elements of
‘better’ plan design are associated with employee income.17 Better-paid
employees have 401(k) plans with more funds, with a greater proportion of
equity funds in their investment lineup (allowing greater diversification in
what is an equity-dominated portfolio), the ability to invest in company
stock (perhaps undesirable from a diversification perspective but attractive
in terms of employee ownership and loyalty), and access to after-tax con-
tributions. Most of these effects, while significant, tend to be relatively small
in economic terms. For example, a 10 percent increase in mean NHCE
income leads to only a 0.1 point increase in the number of funds.
From this analysis, we conclude that employer 401(k) plan design de-
cisions are mainly driven by scale economies (firm size) and employee
Table 10-4 Determinants of Employer 401(k) PlanDesign: Non-Monetary
Plan Features (All Employees)
Investment menu Money access
NFunds
offered
Fund_
stock
ER_
stock
After_
tax Loan
Employer Characteristics
Plan_size 0.914 1.79 0.115 0.083 0.046
[0.172]** [0.546]** [0.012]** [0.014]** [0.011]**
DB 0.537 3.107 0.097 0.194 0.019
[0.699] [1.619] [0.040]* [0.051]** [0.036]
DC 0.634 0.129 0.004 0.064 0.001
[0.591] [1.389] [0.029] [0.034] [0.032]
Employee Characteristics
Mean_comp 0.026 0.038 0.001 0.0009 0.0003
[0.007]** [0.012]** [0.0003]* [0.0004]* [0.0003]
Mean_age 0.216 0.391 0.001 0.006 0.001
[0.124] [0.357] [0.005] [0.006] [0.008]
Mean_tenure 0.058 0.398 0.01 0.002 0.001
[0.088] [0.303] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
Female_pct 0.024 0.08 0.0003 0.0002 0.001
[0.014] [0.035]* [0.001] [0.0008] [0.001]
Observations 507 507 507 507 507
R2 0.1 0.09 0.35 0.24 0.06
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in
brackets. Industry controls included.
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compensation (which for matching contributions is mean NHCE compen-
sation due to tax limits). These results are consistent with the view of 401(k)
plans as mainly a form of employee-preferred tax-deferred compensation.
Better-paid NHCEs are likely to benefit from having a higher fraction of
their earnings paid in the form of tax-deferred compensation, and it
appears that employers design their 401(k) matching contributions plans
with this consideration in mind. Arguably, without federal tax limits on
contributions, both cash- and noncash incentives would both be more
nearly a linear function of earnings. There seems to be little evidence
that plan design is motivated by employer efforts to tailor their workforce
to other demographic characteristics such as age or tenure.
Discussion and Conclusions
This paper examines the determinants of employer decisions regarding
401(k) plan design. Drawing on a unique data-set of more than 500 plans
and over 740,000 employees, we find that patterns of plan design and em-
ployee behavior reflect two forces. On the one hand, better-paid workers
demand ‘richer’ 401(k) plans from employers, but on the other hand,
employers must provide minimum incentives to lower-paid workers under
federal nondiscrimination testing rules. At the plan level we find that match
formulas aremainly a function of NHCE income, after controlling for other
key attributes. Other desirable nonfinancial elements of 401(k) plan de-
sign—such as more investment choice, 401(k) loans or after-tax contribu-
tions—are also a function of workers’ earnings. In other words, 401(k) plan
design appears strongly motivated by a desire to satisfy higher-paid employ-
ees’ demand for tax-advantaged compensation. Controlling on pay, there is
very little evidence that firms design their matching contributions to attract
and retain employees with specific characteristics. This combination of find-
ings leads us to conclude that 401(k) plans aremainly a complex formof tax-
advantaged compensation, with both its provision by employers and its take-
up by employees influenced by the average earnings level of a given firm.
Our findings imply that tax-motivated matching contributions in 401(k)
plans may be an imperfect way of ensuring broad-based retirement security.
As we note, it is better-paid workers who will demand better matching
contributions from their employers in the first place, and take-up of these
matching contributions will be a function of a given workforce’s savings
preferences. Also it appears that federal tax policy regarding nondiscrimi-
nation testing may enhance tax preferences within a firm, but tends to
create inequities across firms. This is because matching incentives and
participation rates tend to be more generous in companies with better-
paid workers. As a result, nondiscrimination rules favor workers in com-
panies with better-paid and longer-tenured workforces, while not helping
those lacking these characteristics. Finally, because of firm-level design
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decisions, saving patterns in 401(k) plans tend to be ‘local’. Thus, a low-
wage worker employed all her life at a high-wage consulting firm would do
better in retirement than if she earned the same salary but worked at a low-
wage retail firm. Her high-wage colleagues in the consulting firm will
demand a larger match, which will in turn induce a higher rate of plan
participation by her and other lower-wage employees.
As a consequence, those seeking to enhance retirement security among
low-income and low-tenured populations might consider alternatives to
matching contributions in 401(k) plans. Options include automatic enroll-
ment (cf. Madrian and Shea 2001), nonelective contributions by employers
or the government, and mandatory retirement plan contributions. Refram-
ing enrollment as a negative election encourages 401(k) saving regardless
of the firm-specific match incentive, and it also induces retirement saving
regardless of that specific workforce’s taste for saving. Employer non-
elective contributions accomplish the same goal but in a different way. By
making the same retirement contribution to all eligible employees, em-
ployers in effect substitute for weak employee saving preferences with their
own. The same would be true of governmental nonelective contributions
made to private plans or to a reformed social security system with personal
accounts. Mandatory retirement plan contributions, whether made by the
employer or employee, are an option adopted by countries such as Singa-
pore and Australia, where they create uniformity of retirement saving
independent of firm-specific characteristics.
Endnotes
1. There are three times as many US workers participating in DC plans as DB plans.
Since 1985, the number of DB plan participants has declined by 8 percent
annually and these plans hold fewer assets than in DC plans (DB assets are
estimated at $2.2 trillion; Vanguard, 2004).
2. In this chapter, we use the term ‘401(k)’ to include both 401(k) and 403(b)
salary deferral plans. The former are offered in the corporate sector, while the
latter are offered by nonprofit employers, but both terms are derived from the
section of the US tax code permitting contributions to these retirement plans to
be tax-qualified under particular conditions (McGill et al. 2004). Our analysis
excludes governmental plans (e.g. so-called Section 457 plans). More than 70
percent of US DC plans are 401(k)-type programs and 85 percent of DC plan
participants have a 401(k) feature.
3. Employer retirement plan contributions are only deductible to the extent of
federal tax limits. Some have argued that firms may derive a benefit from
offering employer stock within a DC plan, but productivity gains from company
stock tend to be negligible and may reflect employer and employee myopia
about benefits and costs (Benartzi et al. 2004; Mitchell and Utkus 2003).
4. For instance, Wachovia states on its website that the ‘employee benefits plan
protects the most important resource of your business—your employees.
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Employee benefits can be one of your most valuable recruiting tools. We can
help you assemble a generous and affordable benefits plan that attracts
and retains the best employees.’ (http://www.wachovia.com/small_biz/page/
0,,446_610_1303_1312,00.html)
5. In fact, Ippolito sees this compensation structure as a way to reward unobserved
but valuable employee traits, such as willingness to defer gratification (‘low
discounters’), on the grounds that these workers may actually be more pro-
ductive. He also believes that DB plans with back-loaded benefits designs permit
firms to reward long tenure and experience.
6. This skewness is not unique to our sample. For instance, Mitchell and Utkus
(2003) report that only 3 percent of US DC plans offer company stock, but
because they are among the largest US firms, 42 percent of participants are
found in these plans.
7. Engelhardt and Kumar (2003, 2004) are an important exception and provide
important detail on the nature of 401(k) matching contributions.
8. In the most common case of the Actual Deferral Percentage or ADP test, if the
saving rates of the NHCEs fall between 2 and 8 percent, the HCE saving rate
cannot be more than 2 percent higher than the NHCE rate. There are different
rules when NHCE saving rates fall below 2 percent or above 8 percent.
9. Under the NDT testing rules, should NHCE contribution rates fall short of the
legally required amount, the plan is said to ‘fail’ nondiscrimination testing. In
this case the plan can either refund HCEs’ contributions, which is a laborious
and time-consuming process for the employer andmay require the employee to
file a revised tax return, or alternatively the employer may simply limit HCE
contributions to some lower rate to avoid failing the test in the first place. For
example, an employer could restrict HCEs to no more than a 6 percent
contribution rate to meet the nondiscrimination rules, in which case a HCE
earning $100,000 would be allowed to contribute only 6 percent, rather than
the statutory 10.5 percent of salary noted earlier. In practice HCEs are often
capped at a flat rate (such as 6 percent) when a plan fails nondiscrimination
testing, though the sponsor may also impose a dollar limit. HCEs subject to a
cap in the 401(k) plan are sometimes eligible for executive compensation or
nonqualified plans instead. Another option for capping HCEs is to subject
those in executive plans to a smaller 401(k) limit, while allowing lower-paid
HCEs not eligible for the executive plan to save at a higher rate.
10. The identity of individual firms and plan participants is masked. Union plans
are excluded from our sample of 507 plans, since there the match is collectively
bargained rather than determined solely by the employer.
11. The datafile does not include measures of employee educational attainment or
workplace financial education programs, though all employees received plan
enrollmentmaterial and a quarterly plan newsletter, and all have access to online
educational materials. We also lack data on vesting schedules for employer
contributions, indicating participants’ ability to take employer contributions
with them when they change jobs. We did investigate tenure patterns in more
detail (an analysis not reported here), and the results were similar to those shown
here.
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12. According to the US Department of Labor, 84 percent of full-time private
industry employees in the US in 2000 were in saving and thrift plans with a
‘determinable’ match rate (DOL 2004: 69).
13. At the employee level, since more participants are in large plans, nearly four in
ten participants are provided with a match equivalent of 3 percent of pay. But
this 3 percent promise can manifest itself in quite different ways in terms of
required employee contribution: as a $0.50 on the dollar match on a 6 percent
employee contribution, as a $1 for dollar match on a 3 percent employee
contribution, or, less frequently, something in-between.
14. With after-tax contributions, employees may withdraw contributions at any
time. Earnings compound tax-free and are subject to the same restrictions
governing pretax contributions. Because of their liquidity, after-tax contribu-
tions compete with pretax saving, and so any regression of pretax saving against
after-tax contributions should show a negative coefficient for the after-tax
indicator. In a number of plan designs, employees who reach various federal
tax limits on pretax contributions are able to make additional after-tax contri-
butions, thereby gaining an additional tax benefit, the ability to defer taxes on
the earnings on such contributions.
15. In the case of DC plans, a 401(k) participant may receive an employer contri-
bution to a companion money purchase plan, profit-sharing plan, or Employee
Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). The profit-sharing or ESOP contribution may
be integrated within the 401(k) plan itself, or it may be in a standalone plan.
16. All equations also control on industrial sector and, predictably, firms in sectors
like manufacturing or finance and insurance had more generous designs than
firms in wholesale/retail trade (results not reported here in detail but available
on request).
17. We do not distinguish between NHCE and HCE employees because there are
no federal constraints on nonmonetary plan design features.
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